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NOTE
The Nature and Scope of the Reliance
Requirement in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule 10b-5
Reliance has long been viewed as an indispensable element in the
plaintiff's cause of action under Securities and Exchange Commission
rule 10b-5. The author suggests that it is inaccurate to characterize the
reliance requirement as a fixed concept common to all private actions
arising under 10b-5. Rather the nature and scope of the reliance re-
requirement are molded by a variety of factors which are analyzed in this
Note. In the course of the analysis several important distinctions are
discussed, including the relationships between reliance and materiality,
actual reliance and reasonable reliance, and causation and reliance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1940's when the courts first began to recognize an
implied private right of action" under Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule lob-5,2 they have had difficulty defining
the scope of this cause of action. Although courts have relied heav-
ily on concepts borrowed from common law and equitable fraud,
the policy bases of rule 10b-5 have precluded a wholesale carryover
of the ancestral elements. This difficulty, aggravated by occasion-
ally turbid court discussions, has resulted in a plethora of articles
attempting to clarify the law relating to rule 10b-5 generally, and
recently the specific element of reliance has attracted the attention
of several commentators.3 The purpose of this Note is to analyze
1 E.g., Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Speed v. Transamer-
ica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2 17 C.FP.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970), promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act],
Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any, person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to staie
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
8See, e.g., Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of
Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 CoLUM. L REv. 1361 (1965); Note,
Reliance Under Rule 1Ob-5: Is the "Reasonable lezvesto$" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM.
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the reliance notion, and, in so doing, to attempt to dispel some mis-
conceptions that have arisen concerning its parameters in 10b-5 ac-
tions.
Generally, before a private plaintiff can recover under rule 10b-
5, he must have relied on the defendant's fraud.4  Reliance in this
context requires that one believe the misrepresentation to be ac-
curate and act, or fail to act,5 because of that 'belief.' Since there
are a variety of factual situations that give rise to 10b-5 liability,
the foregoing general statements must be qualified. In order to
determine the standard of reliance that must be met, or whether re-
liance is required at all, it is necessary to distinguish three classes of
cases: (1) those involving affirmative misrepresentations known by
the defendant to be false, (2) those involving negligent misrepre-
sentations, and (3) those involving pure omissions. As a review
of these categories will indicate, the reliance requirement is qualified
by the concept of reasonableness only in cases involving negligent
misrepresentations. In another category - pure omissions - no
reliance whatsoever has been required. In the final category -
misrepresentations known to be false - actual reliance is necessary
for recovery, but arguments can be made in specialized instances
that it should not be required at all.7
L. REv. 562 (1972); Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L REV.
860 (1972); Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. I.
REV. 824 (1965); Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 1OB-5 [sic]: A
Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YA.E L.J. 658 (1965).
4 A. BROMBERG, SECUrIES LAW: FRAUD - SEC RuLE lob-5 § 8.6(1), at 209
(1971). As the analysis which follows will show, this is an oversimplification. Read
broadly, the Supreme Court decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972), affg in part, rev'g in part, Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th
Cir. 1970), may be taken as negating the need for reliance in all cases. However,
this does not appear to be the most accurate reading of the case. See note 122, infra.
5 Whether failure to act is a sufficient basis to allow recovery depends upon whether
the courts interpret lob-5 as requiring a purchase or a sale of securities before liability
can be imposed. Many courts have imposed such a requirement. E.g., Greater Iowa
Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cit. 1967), Keers & Co. v. American Steel &
Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). It is arguable that a purchase-sale
requirement should not be imposed as it would permit wrongdoers to escape liability
when the fraudulent scheme has succeeded in deterring the victim from entering into
a security transaction. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps, No. 71-2223 (9th Cir. May, 1972). The brief is summarized in [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 9 93,484 (May 1972). See Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,718 at 93,178 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 1973).
A full discussion of this problem, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
6 This definition breaks the test for reliance down into its two constituent parts. See
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 7.13, at 584 & n.5 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS §
108, at 714-15 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938). For a dis-
cussion of a more common, but virtually identical definition of reliance, see text ac-
companying notes 27-28 infra.
7 See note 97 infra.
RELIANCE UNDER RULE lOb-5
Once the limits of the reliance requirement in each of these cate-
gories have been discussed, this Note will distinguish three concepts
which are often confused: actual reliance, reasonable reliance, and
materiality. The resulting set of subtle distinctions, it is submitted,
are consistent with precedent as well as the purposes of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
II. RULE 10b-5 IN PERSPECTIVE
A. Purposes of Rule 1 Ob-5
The purposes of rule lob-5, and securities regulation in general,
are important in understanding the approach the courts have taken
in structuring the private action under lob-5. The Supreme Court,
in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.," referring to secu-
rities regulation generally, stated: "A fundamental purpose, common
to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high stan-
dard of business ethics in the securities industry."9 More recently,
in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,10
the Supreme Court put the purpose of the Exchange Act on a much
broader footing, indicating that Congress sought to remedy such
problems as "disregard of trust relationships, . . . manipulation, mi-
vestor's ignorance, and the like" through the passage of the Ex-
change Act."
Rule lob-5 has been of significant importance in helping the
SEC work effectively to achieve these objectives. At the narrowest,
the rule can be viewed as dosing a loophole: 10b-5 provides protec-
tion against fraud perpetrated by buyers or sellers of securities,
whereas previously, general antifraud relief under the securities
laws was available only against the fraudulent practices of sellers.'
8 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
9Id. at 186. Accord, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826-27
(5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGUtLATION 1435 (2d ed. 1961); Recent Case, 82 HARV. L. REV. 938, 947 (1969).
10 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
1lId. at 11-12.
12 Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC Securities and Ex-
change Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1970) thereinafter cited as the Securities Act], contains several provisions
that are aimed at fraudulent practices of sellers but none that are aimed at fraudulent
practices of buyers. Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), expressly provides for
civil liability for fraud in connection with an offer or sale of a security. Section 11(a),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970), also provides civil remedies for purchasers of securities
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At the broadest, lob-5 can be viewed as a rule aimed at equalizing
the bargaining positions of buyers and sellers, promoting full and
accurate disclosure of facts necessary to ensure a more efficient al-
location of resources, preventing investors with superior knowledge
from victimizing uniformed investors, 3 and building public confi-
dence in the fairness of securities transactions.14
If the SEC had the necessary manpower, these goals could per-
haps be achieved through strict enforcement of rule lob-5.15 Fur-
thermore, although SEC action may well prevent future injury, it
does not compensate for past injuries.'6 By implying a private cause
of action under lob-5, the courts have been able to compensate the
victims of fraud 7 and aid the SEC in achieving the overall policy
goals of lob-5.' 8 The interaction between these policy considerations
and the common law is particularly important as it gives direction to
development of the private right of action under lob-5.
B. Common Law Fraud and Rule 10b-5
Since the private right of action under lob-5 was judicially de-
if the fraud is in a registration statement. The implied private right of action, Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd as to compensa-
tory damages, rev'd as to punitive damages, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); contra, Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 336 F. Supp.
890 (N.D. Maine 1971), and the express provisions for disciplinary action by the SEC
under section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), again are limited to fraud in con-
nection with the offer or sale of any security. For a further discussion of the relationship
between Securities Act § 17(a) and rule 10b-5, see notes 40-41 infra.
13 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); Brennan v.
Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
14 See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 4, §§ 12.2-.6.
15 See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970).
16 Id., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965). Even a 10b-5 suit by the SEC to force a disgorging of illicit profits
is primarily based on the deterrent effect of the remedy. SEC v. Manor Nursing Cen-
ters, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cit. 1972).
17 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1970); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965);
1 BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 2.4(1) (a).
18 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970); Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 1 BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 2.4(1) (d); Ruder,
Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L
REV. 627, 637 n.53 (1963). It is generally accepted that where the court does imply a
private remedy under a statute "it is acting to further the general purpose which it finds
in the legislation .... " RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286 comment d (1965).
But cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
RELIANCE UNDER RULE lob-5
rived, few express statutory guidelines exist for identifying and de-
fining its elements. The courts, therefore, have looked to common
law and equitable fraud concepts in developing and applying the
private lob-5 action. That they should logically do so is apparent
from the language of lob-5 and the nature of the lob-5 action.
First, the words "fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" in subsections (a)
and (c) of rule lob-5 are words with established meanings, which
can easily be read into private actions under the rule." Second,
since providing relief to victims of fraud is an important aspect of
the private right of action under 1ob-5, and since this is also the
basic purpose of fraud actions at common law and at equity, the
courts have naturally focused on the tort action of deceit and on the
equitable action of rescission in structuring the elements of the lob-
5 action. This does not mean that courts "[froze common law
fraud] elements for purposes of section 10(b) as they stood in 1934
nor [does it] forbid federal courts from taking part in the continu-
ing growth of the common law of fraud and deceit,"' 2 but it does
mean that common law fraud provides a starting point from which
the courts can develop a federal common law that will promote the
broad policy goals of lob-5.21
At common law the defrauded plaintiff had two alternative
remedies available: one at law for the tort of deceit22 or one at
equity for rescission.23 The elements of these common law fraud
19 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L.
REV. 527, 537 (1947); Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 3,
at 832. Cf. Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YALE L.J. 509, 511
(1947).
2 0 Recent Case, 82 HARv. L. REv. 938,947 (1969).
21 Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 3, at 832 n.36. See
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 270 (1972); Civil Liability Under
Section lOB and Rule 1OB-5, supra note 3, at 667.
Some courts have suggested that the elements of civil actions arising under 10b-5
are not limited to their common law definitions. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 806, 810 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178,
1192-93 (W.D. Ark. 1969), revzd on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). In fact, the Supreme Court has recently suggested that
a remedy may be available under 10b-5 even if no remedy is available under common
law fraud. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
Thus, in applying the elements of common law fraud to actions under 10b-5, the courts
are well disposed to liberalize the elements of common law fraud, making them more
favorable to the plaintiff.
22 Deceit requires a misrepresentation of a material fact; scienter (i.e., that the de-
fendant knowingly made a false statement); justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, causing
damage; and malice, if punitive damages are sought PROSsER, supra note 6, §§ 105,
109, 110.
23 '"rhe elements of rescission ... are 'misrepresentation' of a 'material' 'fact' on
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actions have crept, in varying degrees, into, civil actions based on
10b-5 violations.24
For the most part, the reliance element in 10b-5 cases assumes
the same meaning it has in common law deceit actions.25 The ele-
ment of reliance operates to establish the causal connection between
the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's actions. Causation is the
ultimate fact that must be proved, and reliance is the only acknowl-
edged way to prove causation in misrepresentation cases.26 As
pointed out above, actual reliance requires both that one believe the
misrepresentation to be accurate and that one enter into a securities
transaction because of that belief. These dual requirements are
generally subsumed under another common test which states that
actual reliance is established if "the misrepresentation is a substan-
tial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in [the
defrauded plaintiff's] loss."'  Normally, a misrepresentation cannot
be a substantial factor in determining the plaintiff's course of con-
duct if he does not believe the misrepresentation.2"
When viewed in the perspective of its objectives and in the
perspective of common law, the implied private right of action un-
der 10b-5 can be seen as an effort to apply the common law fraud
concepts to securities regulation while moving beyond the restric-
tions of common law fraud where necessary to achieve the broad,
remedial purposes of lob-5. The reliance element, in particular,
has been influenced by both the common law and the purposes of
10b-5. When it is required it takes the form of simple, actual reli-
ance or, more than that, reasonable reliance, but in either event it as-
sumes much the same meaning as it has at common law.
Both the decision to require some element of reliance and the
characterization of the reliance requirement are, at common law and
which the [plaintiff) 'justifiably relied.'" 3 Loss, supra note 9, at 1627, 6 Loss at 3784.
Rescission can be granted if the fact is not material provided that the fraud produces
the intended consequences. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476, comment b (1932).
24 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404U.S. 1004 (1971). Seenote2lsupra.
25 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965). When the lob-5 action is for rescission, the same rule applies. See
note 58 infra & accompanying text.
20 See note 103 infra & accompanying text. This "transaction causation" must be
distinguished from the causation of harm to the plaintiff or "damage causation." See
notes 96-101 infra & accompanying text.
2 7 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287
F. Supp. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd as to compensatory, rev'd as to punitive dam-
ages, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
2 8 There is, however, an exception to this general rule. See note 104 infra.
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under rule lob-5, based on the nature of the fraud that gives rise
to the plaintiff's injury and on the type of relief sought. The re-
mainder of this Note will analyze the element of the reliance under
10b-5 in terms of three forms which the defendant's fraud may take.
III. MISREPRESENTATIONS KNOWN BY THE
DEFENDANT TO BE FALSE OR MISLEADING
A. The Reliance Requirement at Common Law
Because the common law has been so influential in the develop-
ment of the reliance concept under rule lob-5, it is important to un-
derstand the reliance requirement in actions for deceit and rescission.
In an equitable action for rescission, negligent reliance on the part
of the plaintiff cannot shield the defendant, whether his misrepre-
sentations are intentional or not."9 It makes no difference that the
plaintiff is foolish or ignorant,30 or that the plaintiff fails to investi-
gate the defendant's misrepresentations. 81 Actual,3 2 justifiable 3 re-
liance is all that is required.
Deceit and rescission actions based on intentional misrepresenta-
tions are similar, to the extent that in neither does the plaintiff's
reliance have to be reasonable. In an action for deceit, the plain-
tiff's reliance can be negligent and he is still not prevented from
recovering. 4 This means that the plaintiff has no duty to investi-
gate the defendant's statements before he can recover.3 5 According
to the American Law Institute (ALI), even if the plaintiff is on
notice that the defendant's representations may be false there is no
need to investigate. As in equitable rescission, justifiable reliance
29 Given that a material fact is misrepresented, scienter, in itself, is unnecessary for
recovery in recission actions. 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 885 (1941);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476 comment b (1932). Likewise it appears as if
the standard of reliance which is required for recovery is not tied to proof of scienter.
Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476, comments c & d A1932). A distinction,
however, has been made between willful and innocent misrepresentations of law for
purposes of reliance. Actual reliance is required if the misrepresentation is made with
scienter but justifiable reliance is required for innocent misrepresentations. RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION § 55 (1937). For a discussion of the term "justifiable," see
note 36 infra.
3 0 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS § 471, comment i (1932).
31 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 471, Illus. 3, 5 (1932); 12 S. WILISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1512 at 472 (3d ed. 1970).
3 2 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 9, comment b (1937).
3 3 
"Justifiable reliance ' in equitable rescission has essentially the same meaning as
in the tort action of deceit. See POMEROY, supra note 29, § 891. See generally note
36, infra.
8 4 PRossER, supra note 6, at 716.
3 5 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 540 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
1973]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 363
is all that is required. 6 The ALI rejected a proposal which would
have denied recovery if the plaintiff knew or had reason to know
of facts which made his reliance unreasonable. The primary ob-
jection voiced against this proposal was that it allowed contributory
negligence to be a defense to an intentional tort."
B. Reliance Under Rule lOb-5
Since the plaintiff's reliance need not be reasonable at common
law when the defendant knows his representations are untrue, in
light of the policy underlying 10b-5 the same standard should ap-
ply in private actions under the rule. In fact, most courts have
held that in 10b-5 cases where the defendant's misrepresentations
are intentional, the plaintiff's reliance need not be reasonable.3"
Actual reliance was the standard adopted in Globus v. Law Re-
search Service, Inc.39 The plaintiff in Globus had brought an ac-
tion under common law fraud, rule lob-5, and section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 193340 alleging that he bought securities from the
36 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 537 (1938). Reasonable reliance imposes an affirma-
tive duty upon the plaintiff to investigate the truth of the misrepresentations in certain
cases before he can rely. Justifiable reliance imposes no such affirmative duty. Reliance
is justified by the content of what is said or the person who said it. For example, the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1938) prevents reliance from being justified if the plain-
tiff knows it is false or its falsity is obvious (§ 541), or the matter is immaterial (§
538). Further, reliance can be justified if the statement is based on facts which are
peculiarly within the knowledge or under the power of the party making the misrepre-
sentation. 3 POMEROY, supra note 29, § 891 at 506. In none of these cases is investi-
gation required for the reliance to be justified; rather the justifiability of the reliance is
determined at the moment the statement is made. It has been suggested that the ac-
ceptable justifications for reliance allowed under rule lOb-5 are less stringent than those
allowed at common law. See Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806,
810 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
37 42 ALl PROCEEDINGS 322-31 (1965).
38 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971); Lehigh Valley
Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969); Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), arid as to compensa-
tory damages, rev'd as to punitive damages, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cit. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970). See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 879 (1965). But see Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100,
104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). This is not a new position and
it has been recognized by several commentators. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 8.4
(120), (515); Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 1OB-5, supra note 3, at 677.
But see Reliance Under Rule 1 Ob-5, supra note 3.
39 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd as to compensatory damages, rev'd as
to punitive damages, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
40 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirect-
ly -
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defendant in reliance upon fraudulently misleading statements con-
cerning the relationship between the defendant and Sperry Rand
Corporation. The trial court had instructed the jury to award com-
pensatory damages under section 17(a)41 if they found that damage
to the plaintiff resulted from statements which contained material
facts known by the defendant to be false or misleading, provided
that the plaintiff had actually relied on the statement.42 The trial
court also instructed the jury on punitive damages.43  Following an
adverse verdict, the defendants moved, inter alia, for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict as to the award of punitive damages on
the ground that "since the jury found for the defendants on the
common law fraud claim, punitive damages could not be awarded
against them." 44  In rejecting this argument, the court was careful
to point out that actual reliance is the appropriate standard under the
federal securities law and that such reliance need not even be
justifiable:
[Defendants' theory] would require that a plaintiff establish (1)justifiable reliance, necessary in a common law deceit action, rather
than the federal securities law fraud's actual reliance test, i.e., that
plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did
if the defendant had disclosed the omitted fact .... 45
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or auiy omission to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser....
41 Section 17(a), which applies only to defrauded buyers of securities, and rule
10b-5, which applies to both defrauded buyers and sellers of securities, are similar in
several important respects. The language used in 10b-5 is derived from 17(a). SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 n.22 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 978 (1969); 1 BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 2.2(410). The similarity is strength-
ened by the fact that both the section and the rule give rise to an implied private right
of action. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Furthermore, many of the elements of the two ac-
tions are the same. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 254 (D. Md.
1971). Compare the approach taken by the district court in Globus, 287 F. Supp. at
197 (establishment of cause of action under 17(a) establishes cause of action under
10b-5) with that taken by the court of appeals, 418 F.2d at 1283-84 (establishment of
10b-5 action by defrauded buyer establishes action under 17(a) ). Finally, the reliance
requirement is identical under both. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F, Supp. at
261.
42 287 F. Supp. at 194.
431d.
44 Id. at 195.
45 Id. (emphasis added). Although the court of appeals reversed as to the award of
punitive damages, it did so on policy and statutory grounds unrelated to the question of
reliance.
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Another lob-5 case involving misrepresentations known by the
defendant to be false is Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton,41 in
which Johns Hopkins sought to rescind its purchase of an oil and
gas production payment. The court pointed out that although the
defendant had not acted as an "evil man," he had knowledge of
material facts that made his representations inaccurate and mislead-
ing. After noting that reliance is required under lob-5, the court
found that the undisputed facts were sufficient to show that reliance
was present.47 In discussing the reliance requirement, the court indi-
cated that only actual reliance was required and that, even if there
were no investigation, the plaintiff could still prove reliance on the
intentionally misleading statements.48  This suggests that where the
plaintiff has actually relied, lack of investigation, which may make
such reliance unreasonable, is not a sufficient basis upon which to
deny recovery. The court noted, however, that even if the plaintiff's
reliance must be reasonable, that is, even if it must have had a
"right to rely," the plaintiff could still recover since it had acted as
a reasonable man would have under similar circumstances.49
In Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of lack-
sonville,0 the defendant bank sold loan participation agreements
to the plaintiff. In the course of negotiations preceding this sale, the
defendant represented to the plaintiff that the guarantors of the
loan in question were "high type individuals," "outstanding law-
yers," and "outstanding citizens," and that the prime guarantor was
a good customer of the defendant and was "all right.""' In reality,
however, the defendant had had difficulty collecting on previous
notes of the prime guarantor; hence the statements were found to
be intentionally false and actionable. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff was a well-informed, knowledgeable investment institu-
tion and therefore should not be extended the protections applicable
to unsophisticated investors. This argument was nothing more than
a thinly veiled attempt to introduce the requirement of reasonable
reliance into a case involving a misrepresentation known to be false
by the defendant. The court rejected the argument out of hand:
"Fraud may also be perpetrated upon the powerful and the sophisti-
cated. . . . The protection and remedies of the Securities Act are
46 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971).
47 Id. at 260.
481d. at 257 & n.10.
491d. at 258.
0 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
51 Id. at 992.
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not accorded only to those who fail a battery of information and in-
telligence tests." 52 Thus, the actuality of the reliance and not its
objective or subjective reasonableness was the appropriate issue in
Lehigh Valley; reasonable reliance, objectively or subjectively mea-
sured, was properly rejected.
In Globus, Johns Hopkins, and Lehigh Valley, after finding that
the defendants made knowingly false statements, the courts applied
the common law rule that a plaintiff is not precluded from recovery
if he negligently relies on a misrepresentation known by the defen-
dant to be false. As these cases point out, the quality of the defen-
dants' actions is a critical factor in determining the standard of reli-
ance to which the plaintiff must conform. If the underlying
rationale for rejecting a reasonable reliance standard in cases involv-
ing misrepresentations known to be false were articulated, it would
no doubt center on the same reasons used for such a rejection in
common law fraud: courts are understandably loathe to require a
plaintiff to conform to the standard of a reasonable man if that al-
lows a defendant to knowingly inflict injury, and to do so with im-
punity.
IV. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
When the misrepresentation is negligently rather than know-
ingly made, a much different situation is presented. With negligent
misrepresentations, adequate justification exists for requiring that the
plaintiff's reliance be reasonable before he can recover in a 10b-5
action." Even here, however, confusion can be created in distin-
guishing between actual reliance, objectively reasonable reliance, and
subjectively reasonable reliance.
In actions based on negligent misrepresentations the reliance re-
quirements under 10b-5 and at common law are similar. In the
52Id.
53 A misrepresentation is negligent if, "... considering all the circumstances, and
particularly that of accessability to the facts, the defendant did not act as would the
ordinarily prudent person to avoid misrepresentation .... ." Note, Proof of Scienter
Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lob-5, 63 MIcH. L REV.
1070, 1079 (1965).
54 A plaintiff has reasonably relied if he has actually relied and if his belief in the
accuracy of the defendant's representations was reasonable.
One writer has suggested that courts have required that the plaintiff's reliance be
reasonable in all cases before recovery can be obtained under lOb-5. Reliance Under
Rule lob-5, supra note 3, at 565-66. However, by failing to distinguish negligent
misrepresentations both from misrepresentations known to be false and from pure omis-
sions, this theory of reasonable reliance is more restrictive than common law fraud, see
notes 29-37 supra & accompanying text, and therefore, is inconsistent with the lib-
eral policy bases of rule lob-5. See notes 8-18 infra & accompanying text.
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equitable action of recission a plaintiff will be barred from recovery
if his reliance is unjustified.55 In tort actions of deceit, on the other
hand, where there is very little case law on this issue,56 the ALI has
decided that "the recipient of a negligent misrepresentation is
barred from recovery for a pecuniary loss suffered in reliance upon
it if he is negligent in so relying.""
The courts have generally adopted the same position in 10b-5
actions as the ALI adopted in deceit actions and have found that the
plaintiff's reliance must be reasonable when the defendant's misrep-
resentations are negligent.58  In City National Bank v. Vander-
boom,59 the defendant-investors had obtained a loan from City Na-
tional to buy securities in various corporations. When they failed
to pay back the loan, the bank filed suit. Vanderboom counter-
claimed under lob-5, alleging that the 'bank had falsely represented
the financial status of the corporations whose stock they had pur-
chased with the proceeds of the loan. The trial court found that
the bank did not have knowledge of the alleged fraud perpetrated
by one of its officers, that knowledge of the alleged fraud could not
be imputed to the bank, that the bank acted in good faith, and that
the bank merely loaned money to the investors and did not sell or
offer to sell any securities.60 The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding that lOb-5 did not apply because the transac-
tion counterclaimed upon was not "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security," and that, therefore, the purchaser-seller
standing requirement of the rule was not satisfied.61
The discussion of the investors' reliance upon the allegedly
negligent misrepresentations by the bank, albeit dict-a, is nonethe-
less instructive. The Eighth Circuit, after setting forth reasonable
55 See notes 29-33 sapra & accompanying text.
56 42 ALI PROCEEDiNGS 394 (1965).
5 7 RESTAT EMNT (SEcoNi) OF TORTS § 552A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
5 8 This is also the position taken by most commentators who have considered this
question. Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 1ob-5, supra note 3, at 841; Civil
Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 1OB-5, supra note 3, at 673. However, there
are isolated instances where courts have refused to require reasonable reliance in such
situations. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
Arguably the relief requested should be a factor in determining the reliance stan-
dard. This would necessitate adoption of a justifiable reliance standard where rescission
is sought, see note 55 supra & accompanying text, and a reasonable reliance standard
where damages are sought. Such an approach would retain consistency between the
private action under lob-5 and the ancestral actions of deceit and rescission.
69 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
60 422 F.2d at 227.
6l Id. at 228.
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reliance as the requisite standard,6 2 found the investors' reliance to
be negligent.63 Although the reasonable reliance standard used in
Vanderboom was intended to be an objective standard," the court
noted that because of the defendant-investors' ready access to the
information involved, they were expected to adhere to a higher de-
gree of care in relying than investors lacking such access to rele-
vant information.65 This introduces a subjective standard of rea-
sonableness - one that takes into account changes in the requisite
standard of care based on facts peculiar to the individual plaintiff's
situation - rather than an objective standard.66
Under the reasonable reliance requirement both subjective and
objective standards have been used to measure the reasonableness of
the reliance. The blurring of the distinction between the subjective
andhe objective standards in Vanderboom should not obscure the
fact that the two standards have been used in different situations by
the courts.6 7  It should also not obscure the fact that the use of sub-
62 With regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable in-
vestor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation and
in the exercise of due care, would have been entided to rely upon the misrep-
resentation ....
It should be noted from the outset that this "reasonable investor" test is
an objective standard. Whether an investor did in fact rely upon a misrepre-
sentation is immaterial for the purpose of determining statutory coverage,
though reliance is a predicate for recovery once coverage is established.
Id. at 230-31. That this test applies to negligent misrepresentations is clear not only
from the fact that this was the situation facing the court, but also from a footnote to
its opinion where the court agreed with a commentator who had "suggested that reason-
able reliance should be a condition to all private actions based on negligent misrepre-





6 Actually, subjective and objective reasonableness differ only in degree. When the
term "investor" is substituted for "man" in the reasonable man test, the test begins to
reflect facts peculiar to the individual plaintiff but it is still an objective standard. As
the test is increasingly modified by more qualities of the individual plaintiff whose re-
liance is being evaluated, however, it becomes an increasingly subjective standard. See
Seavey, Negligence - Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1927). Such
a subjective standard of care would consider such factors as the plantiff's general busi-
ness experience and expertise; his acquaintance with the affairs of the corporation; his
access to information misrepresented; the existence of a fiduciary relationship; and,
whether he initiated the transaction. See Reliance Under Rule lob-5, supra note 3.
67 Cases which require subjective reasonableness can be distinguished from those
requiring objective reasonableness on the basis of the nature of the transaction giving
rise to the alleged injury. In indirect, impersonal securities transactions, such as those
over a stock exchange, the subjective reasonableness of reliance is difficult to prove.
Thus, in such cases the applicable standard should be objective. In face-to-face trans-
actions, however, where subjective reasonableness is susceptible of proof, the courts
tend to hold plaintiffs to such a standard. Reliance Under Rule lOb-5, supra note 3,
at 576-77.
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jective factors by a court does not necessarily mean that it has
adopted the reasonable reliance standard, since actual reliance is
also based on subjective factors. 68
Subjective factors were used in Myzel v. Fields,69 although the
court rejected the reasonable reliance standard. The plaintiffs,
four shareholders in a small corporation in which the individual de-
fendants were also shareholders, sold their shares to the defendants
because of gloomy statements made by the defendants about the
corporation's financial position. The trial court held the defendants
liable on the basis of jury findings that the defendants knew the mis-
representations were false, and that the plaintiffs had actually relied
upon them. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that since the de-
fendants need only be negligent to satisfy the 10b-5 scienter re-
quirement, they were not prejudiced by the district court's jury in-
struction that they had to be "found conscious wrongdoers before
liability ensued."7  The court of appeals then went on to hold
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that
the plaintiffs had actually relied.7' Three plaintiffs were found to
have relied since they were unfamiliar with the business and had to
place their total trust in the defendants. 7' Because the fourth plain-
tiff, who was more familiar with the business, failed to investigate,
the appellate court found him to be "if anything ... grossly negli-
gent." 73  However, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the jury
could properly find "naked reliance in this particular case."74 Thus
even though the fourth plaintiff was found to have been unreason-
able, he was still allowed recovery because he actually relied. Rea-
68 See note 76 infra. A basic distinction in the use of subjective factors in the con-
text of reasonable reliance, as opposed to actual reliance, is that insofar as actual reliance
is concerned, subjective factors are used to establish the actuality of the particular plain-
tiff's reliance. On the other hand, in the context of reasonable reliance, when subjec-
tive factors are used it is to establish the standard of care to which the plaintiff must
have conformed: the subjective reasonableness of the particular plaintiff's reliance is
immaterial, the relevant inquiry being whether the reasonable investor in the plaintiff's
circumstances would have relied.
69386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
70 386 F.2d at 734-35. Although it appears that the court of appeals held the de-
fendants to a negligence standard, its agreement with the district court's use of an ac-
tual, rather than reasonable, reliance standard, see notes 71-74 infra & accompanying
text, may indicate that the appellate court's analysis was tied to the jury's finding of a
knowing misrepresentation.
71 Id. at 735-36.
72 Id.
78 Id. at 736.
74 Id. at 737.
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sonable reliance was thereby rejected and actual reliance was af-
firmed as the standard for recovery.
Myzel points out that the use of subjective factors does not indi-
cate the court had adopted the reasonable reliance standard. 5 Un-
der certain circumstances, subjective factors are indispensable in de-
termining the reasonableness of the reliance, but this is not their
sole function. In Myzel the court used subjective factors in apply-
ing an actual reliance test.7" Indeed, the only way actual reliance
can be established is to look at such factors as would focus on the
individual plaintiff and determine whether, in light of the plain-
tiff's particular idiosyncracies and the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, it is probable that he actually relied, that is, that the
fraud played a substantial role in his decision-making process.
This is not to say that there is no relationship whatsoever between
actual reliance and reasonable reliance. The absence of reasonable-
ness may well be a factor in determining the credibility of the plain-
tiff's allegation that he actually relied. But where only actual reli-
ance is required, the lack of reasonable reliance will not preclude a
plaintiff from recovery if actual reliance can otherwise be shown.
As opposed to Myzel, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 7 does
not deviate from the common law rule that the plaintiff's reliance
must be reasonable when the defendant's conduct is merely negli-
gent. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS), by April 12, 1964, had suf-
ficient facts to compel a conclusion that they had just discovered
an enormous mineral deposit on lands to which they owned mineral
rights. In response to rumors started by a news leak of the dis-
covery, TGS issued a press release on April 12 denying knowledge
of the extent and great value of the discovery. On April 16, an-
other press release was issued detailing the extent of the discovery.
After agreeing with the district court that the April 12 press re-
lease was materially misleading,78 the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the press release had been negligently issued by TGS.79 The court
75 But see Reliance Under Rule lob-5, supra note 3, at 571 & n.56.
76 "T]he question of actual reliance is a subjective one. Myzel v. Fields, supra, 386
F.2 at 737." Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 (B. D. Ark.
1972).
77 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
78446 F.2d at 97.
79 Although the district court found that the press release was "'intentionally decep-
tive. .. and knowingly deficient in material facts,"' the court of appeals noted only
that it could not "conclude that TGS sustained its burden of proving that it did not
know of the misrepresentation, nor was it demonstrated that with due diligence TGS
could not have known of the faultiness of the statement." Id. at 102.
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of appeals then scrutinized the district court's finding that "each of
the [plaintiffs] herein relied on [the April 12 press release) in mak-
ing his decision to sell his TGS stock, and that none knew of the
announcement of April 16 at the time of his sale."'80 Although
agreeing that the evidence demonstrated that the misleading release
was a substantial factor in each plaintiff's decision to sell, and that
they had, therefore, actually relied,"' the court of appeals denied
recovery to those plaintiffs whose reliance was unreasonable.
At some point in time after the publication of a curative state-
ment such as that of April 16, stockholders should no longer be
able to claim reliance on the deceptive release, sell, and then sue
for damages when the stock value continues to rise. This is but a
requirement that stockholders too act in good faith and with due
diligence in purchasing and selling stock....
... We conclude that by Wednesday, April 22 . . . the rea-
sonable investor would have become informed of the April 16 re-
lease and could no longer rely on the earlier release in selling TGS
stock.8
Mitchell, therefore, clearly points out the distinction between
actual and reasonable reliance. Where reliance is required, in order
for the plaintiff to recover there must always be, at a minimum,
actual reliance. When the circumstances call for reasonable reli-
ance standards, the plaintiff must demonstrate that, in addition to
actually believing the accuracy of the misrepresentation, his belief
was reasonable in light of the facts which he knew or should have
known at the time he relied.
The adoption of the reasonable reliance standard in cases such
as Mitchell and Vanderboom probably stems from an analogy to con-
tributory negligence. Just as the defendant is not held liable for his
own negligence if the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, a defen-
dant should not be held liable for a negligent misrepresentation
if the plaintiff would not have been injured had he not negligently
relied on the misrepresentation. 8 Therefore, where reliance is re-
quired, the proper approach is to tie the standard of reliance which
the plaintiff must meet to the level of scienter which has been prov-
en. If the plaintiff can prove that the defendant made the mis-
representation with knowledge of its falsity, then the plaintiff need
SOld.
81 ld. at 103.
82d.
88 It should be pointed out that reasonable reliance is different from contributory
negligence in that it is an element of the cause of action where it is required, whereas
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense.
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only prove that he actually relied. On the other hand, if the plain-
tiff can only show that the defendant was negligent in making the
misrepresentation, then the plantiff must prove also that his reliance
was reasonable.
Not all courts, however, have adopted the reasonable reliance re-
quirement in cases of negligent misrepresentation. Notable among
these cases is Myzel v. Fields.4  Cases such as Myzel are consistent
with the language used by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.85 which suggested that the
remedies provided by 10b-5 may not be limited by common law
fraud. Such cases are also in accord with the current sentiment dis-
favoring the defense of contributory negligence because of its often
harsh and unjust results.8 6
V. PURE OMISSIONS
A. Absence of Necessity for Reliance
Situations in which a defendant is liable under rule 10b-5 for a
total failure to disclose material information as to which there was
a duty to disclose are quite different, insofar as reliance is concerned,
from situations involving affirmative misrepresentations. The basic
difference stems from the fact that "reliance on the nondisclosure
of a fact is a particularly difficult matter to define or prove."87 Since
reliance requires a belief in the truth of the fact represented,88 and
since no fact is represented by silence,89 reliance is virtually impos-
sible to prove in cases involving pure omissions. Furthermore,
were proof of reliance required in such cases, two of the basic pur-
poses of allowing private recovery under rule 10b-5 - aiding the
SEC in achieving the broad policy goals of the rule90 and compen-
sating the victims of fraud through modification of the doctrine of
caveat emptor91 - would be frustrated." Therefore, in cases in-
84386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
85 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
86 See PROSSER, supra note 6, at 418.
87 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970). See 2 BROM-
BERG, spra note 4, § 8.6, at 209.
88 See note 6, supra & accompanying text.
89 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965), implicitly rejected the notion that by maintaining silence the defendant
was representing the negative of the matter concealed from the plaintiff when it stated
that the plaintiff need not show active reliance on the defendant's silence. See 2 BRoM-
BERG, supra note 4, § 8.6, at 209.
90 See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
91 See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
92 1Because of the difficulty of proving reliance in cases of pure omissions, recovery
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volving pure omissions, "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequi-
site to recovery. '98
B. The Relationships Among Reliance, Materiality,
and Causation
To avoid frustrating the purposes of the implied private action
under rule 10b-5 in pure omission cases, the courts have modified
the alignment of reliance, materiality, and causation. Traditionally,
reliance operates to prove causation. 4 In nondisclosure cases, how-
ever, causation is presumed by proof of materiality, making proof
of reliance unnecessary.9 5
1. Reliance and Causation.- Causation is usually required
twice in actions based on fraud under either the common law action
of deceit or under lob-5." First there must be "transaction causa-
tion," also known as "reliance causation." Under 10b-5 this means
that the misrepresentations or omissions must cause the plaintiff to
buy or sell securities; under common law deceit, to embark on any
course of conduct.9 T The transaction causation requirement is satis-
would be denied in most instances if reliance were required. Obviously the more of-
ten attempted lOb-5 recovery is frustrated by problems of proof, the less motivation
there is for prospective defendants to conform their conduct to the standard set forth
by lOb-5. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965).
98 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). See Painter,
supra note 3, at 1370-71; SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, supra note 3, at 886-88;
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 1OB-5, supra note 3, at 672-73. But see
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
93,773, at 93,376 (10th Cir. 1973).
94 See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
95 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., CCH FED. SEC L. REp. 5 93,714, at 93,168
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Court in Affiliated Ute did not indicate whether or not this pre-
sumption is rebuttable and, if so, what is necessary to rebut it. Arguably it should be re-
buttable. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 8.6(2), at 212.
962 BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 8.7(1), at 216. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
546 (1938). See generally Recent Case, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 787 (1970).
07 Transaction causation is considered by some courts to be an element of lob-5
because the rule provides that the fraud must be "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security" (emphasis added). City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,
230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Heir v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Other courts
require transaction causation because it is essential to common law fraud. At common
law, if the plaintiff "was not in any way influenced by [the misrepresentation or omis-
sion), and would have done the same thing without it for other reasons, his loss
is not attributed to the defendant." PROSSER, supra note 6, at 714.
An exception to the transaction causation notion is the case where the plaintiff need
not enter into a transaction in order for the fraud to be successful as to him. Crane Co.
v. Westinghouse Air Brake, 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,
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fled by a showing of causation-in-fact.98 Causation-in-fact has been
defined as the relationship existing between the defendant's con-
duct and the actions of the plaintiff when the defendant's conduct
is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiff's actions. 9
Second, there must be "damage causation." That is, the plain-
tiff's actions, which were induced by the defendant, must cause
him to suffer an economic loss.100 The damage causation require-
ment is satisfied by a showing of proximate cause. 01 Viewed to-
gether, transaction causation and damage causation require that the
defendant's misrepresentations must have been the cause of the plain-
tiff's damage.
As has been pointed out, the reliance requirement is-a causation
requirement. Once reliance is established, causation-in-fact is also
established because reliance requires that the plaintiff act or refrain
from acting because of his belief in the truth of the defendant's
representations. While this does not require that the defendant's
representation be the sine qua non of the plaintiff's action or non-
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Voege v. American Suma-
tra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). In Crane, for example, the plain-
tiff made a tender offer of fifty dollars per share to Air Brake stockholders for Air Brake
stock. Air Brake resisted this take-over attempt and enlisted the help of American
Standard, which bought significant quantities of Air Brake stock and artificially raised
the market price to fifty dollars per share thereby defeating the plaintiff's tender offer.
In this case, transaction causation, or reliance by the plaintiff, could not logically be an
element of the plaintiff's cause of action because the fraud was such that it could be suc-
cessful whether or not it caused the plaintiff to enter into any transaction. In such
cases, however, damage causation is still required.
98 Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1971).
99 PROSSER, supra note 6, at 240. "The test is one of significance rather than large-
ness or smallness, or quantum." Id. at 240 n.29. The AL, on the other hand, finds
causation-in-fact to exist when the defendant's conduct has any effect in bringing about
the plaintiff's actions. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 431 comment b (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
100 RESTATMENT OF TORTs § 546 (1938). The damage causation requirement in
10b-5 cases is a carryover from the common law. Certification that the conduct of the de-
fendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury is a basic element of tort law. Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake, 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969).
101 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956); 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 6, at 583; RESTATEMiNT (SEcOND) oF ToRTs § 548A (Tent. Draft No. 11,
1965). In order for a proximate or legal cause to exist there must first be a cause-in-fact.
The case law has left open the question of whether the proximate cause relationship exist-
ing between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury requires a concept of
causation-in-fact separate from that required to show transaction causation. Harper and
James appear to believe that once causation-in-fact has been established for purposes
of transaction causation it has been established for purposes of damage causation as well.
1 HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 6, § 7.13 at 584. While it is not clear, Prosser may also
accept this position. See note 97 supra. Of course, once causation-in-fact is established
for purposes of damage causation, there still must be a finding that the cause-in-fact was
the legal or proximate cause as well.
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action, it does require that it be a cause-in-fact. 10 2  In cases involv-
ing affirmative misrepresentations, since proof of reliance is nor-
mally the only method recognized by the courts to prove transac-
tion causation,103 the two concepts are largely coterminous. 1°4 Proof
of reliance is not the only way causation can be established, how-
ever, and in pure omission cases where there is no statement to rely
upon, or where it is otherwise impossible to prove reliance, the
courts have allowed causation to be presumed upon proof of the
materiality of the fact not disclosed.
2. Materiality and Causation.- The use of materiality to pre-
sume causation first received acceptance by the Supreme Court in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., °5 which arose under SEC rule 14a-
9.106 Mills was an action by shareholders seeking to set aside a
merger accomplished through the use of a proxy statement that was
misleading because it failed to adequately disclose material facts. 07
102 See note 113 in!ra.
103 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965), which involved misrepresentations as well as nondisclosures, suggested that
to abandon proof of reliance would be to abandon proof of causation-in-fact.
104 However, reliance and transaction causation are not synonomous, since transac-
tion causation can exist independently of reliance. Suppose for example the plaintiff
is holding shares of defendant corporation. Defendant makes misrepresentations as to
the financial position of the corporation which the plaintiff does not believe but thinks
other shareholders may believe. If other shareholders do believe them, they would
sell their shares and the market value of the plaintiff's shares would fall. Plaintiff
therefore decides to sell and does so within a reasonable time after the defendant makes
the misrepresentation, but not before he sustains a loss on the artifically depressed
market. In this situation the plaintiff could not have relied because he did not believe
the misrepresentations. However, the defendant's misrepresentations were the cause-
in-fact of the plaintiff's decision to sell his shares. See Civil Liability Under Section
1OB and Rule lOB-5, supra note 3, at 672.
105 396 U.S. 375 (1970), rev'g, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968). See generally Recent
Case, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 787 (1970).
106 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.1 4 a-9. This rule is the anti-fraud provision applicable to proxy
statements. It provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light
of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct
any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or mis-
leading.
'
0 7 The merger involved was between Autolite and Mergenthaler Linotype Co.,
which owned 54 percent of Autolite prior to the merger. Liability was based on in-
adequate disclosure of the relationship of the members of the Autolite board of directors,
which endorsed the merger, to Mergenthaler. Although the court of appeals found that
the proxy statement contained information which indicated the relationship, it found
also that the endorsement was in heavier type than information concerning the rela-
tionship and that the proxy statement implied that the Autolite board's endorsement
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The major issue was whether there was a causal connection between
the nondisclosure and the merger. The Seventh Circuit shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant, and held that the defendant could
disprove causation by proof of the fairness of the merger. If the
merger was fair the court could assume that it would probably have
been approved even had there been no omission of a material fact.
The Supreme Court implied that this presumption of lack of causa-
tion would have to be rebutted 'by proof of reliance.10 8  However,
the plaintiffs could not be expected to prove reliance in this situa-
tion, not only because of the many plaintiffs involved, but also be-
cause it involved a cause of action which was based on a nondis-
closure.0 9 The Court noted a further problem with the standard
applied by the Seventh Circuit: there was no reason to believe that
the shareholders would have approved the merger had it been fair."10
After rejecting the standard set down by the Seventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court focused on the question of whether materiality
would be sufficient to prove the causal connection. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, cited several definitions of materiality.
One used frequently appears in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS: A fact is material if "its existence or nonexistence is a mat-
ter to which a reasonable man would attach importance in determin-
ing his choice of action in the transaction in question.""' Accord-
was independently made. Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 432-35 (7th
Cir. 1968). The Court, therefore, concluded that:
As a matter of law the proxy statement failed, in connection with the advice
tendered by the board, adequately to bring out the relationship between the
board members and Mergenthaler. This, in terms of [rule 14a-9], was an
omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein
not misleading.
Id. at 435. With respect to transaction causation or reliance, the fact that Mills in-
volved a half-truth rather than a pure omission should not be important. See notes 122
& 123 infra & accompanying text. In both cases liability is predicated upon material
facts which are not disclosed, and which arguably cannot be relied upon. See notes 88-
89 supra & accompanying text. Furthermore, if reliance is not necessary in half-truth
cases, see notes 122, 123 infra & accompanying text, a fortiori it is not necessary in
pure omission cases.
108 396 U.S. at 382 n.5.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
Accord 6 Loss, supra note 9, at 3534. Materiality has been limited by the SEC to "...
those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before buying or selling the security registered." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j). See 17
C.F.R. § 230A05(l). Both this statement and the one used in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS appear to cover the same ground. See Johns Hopkins University v. Hut-
ton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (4th Cir. 1970). However, the Restatement definition
appears to be the one used most frequently by courts in 10b-5 actions. Rogen v. Ilikon
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ing to Justice Harlan, this definition "embodies a conclusion that the
defect was of such a character that it was considered important
by a reasonable shareholder....112 and thus the finding of material-
ity is sufficient to show the causal relationship between the viola-
tion and the injury."'
The reasoning applied in Mills, although directly applicable to
actions under rule 14a-9, has received indirect judicial recognition
as being applicable to actions arising under lob-5.114 Other cases
have recognized that the reliance requirement in 10b-5 omissions
cases is not essential, but that causation-in-fact is the relevant in-
quiry. 1
Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2 d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
The Restatement definition requires that the reasonable man would be affected by
the misrepresentation. There is a trend toward reducing the degree of probability that
a reasonable man be affected in order for a fact to be material. See SEC Rule lob-5:
A Recent Profile, supra note 3, at 883-84. Some courts have required only that the rea-
sonable man might have been affected, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 154 (1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 978 (1969); or that he might well have been affected, Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1970); or that he could have been
affected, In re Investors Management Co., SEC Securities and Exchange Act Release No.
9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 78,163,
at 80,519 (SEC 1971). See generally Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 569-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Recent Case, 21 CASE W. RES. L REV. 787,
794-95 (1970).
In addition, courts have differed in delineating how the reasonable man must be
affected for a fact to be material. The Restatement requires that he would attach im-
portance to the fact. Accord Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154
(1972). Other courts have phrased this requirement in terms of "affect[ing] the desire
of investors to buy, sell, or hold ... securities," SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d at 849 (emphasis added), acting otherwise than they did, Chasis v. Smith, Bar-
ney & Co., 438 F.2d at 1171, or influencing their decision, id. at 1172. The test which
arises from these two decisions is that something is material if the reasonable investor
might have considered it important in the making of his decision. Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 154. The Supreme Court decisions in Mills and
Affiliated Ute should eliminate this multiplicity of standards. But see Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 93,816 at 93,505 (2d Cir. March
16, 1973). Note that the test for materiality, however defined, is an objective one.
Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966).
112 396 U.S. at 384.
113 Id. at 385. The Court noted that given the materiality of the defect the causal
relationship does not require proof of whether the defect actually had a decisive effect
on the voting, but instead, whether the proxy solicitation containing the defect as op-
posed to the defect itself was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.
Id. at 384-85. This sine qua non test (that the defect must have a decisive effect on the
voting) has been repeatedly discredited as being too favorable to the defendant. E.g.,
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l. Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 696 (5th Cir. 1971);
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
114 Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972); Kahan
v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1970).
115 See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, -Barney & Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir.
1970).
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A direct application of the reasoning in Mills to a 10b-5 case
did not come, however, until Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States." 6 The plaintiffs had sold shares of Affiliated Ute Citizens
through employees of the defendant bank 17 at a price significantly
below the market value, the difference being pocketed by the bank's
employees. The Supreme Court found that the case involved pri-
marily a failure of the employees to disclose the fact that they
"were in a position to gain financially from [the plaintiffs'] sales
and that [the plaintiffs'] shares were selling for a higher price in that
market.""' On these findings the Court held that positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery:"' All that is necessary to
establish the requisite element of causation-in-fact is an obligation
to disclose and the withholding of a material fact. 20 Not only did
Affiliated Ute follow Mills in holding that materiality proves cau-
sation,' 2 ' but it went one step further and directly held that reliance
is not necessary in cases based on nondisclosures.
Arguably, this holding could apply to half-truths as well. The
facts of Affiliated Ute show that several of the violations of rule
lob-5 were half-truths since some of the plaintiffs were told that
the price offered was all that could be given by the bank employees"
116 406 U.S. 128 (1972), affg in part, rev'g in part Reyos v. United States, 421 F.2d
1337 (10th Cir. 1970). See, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 21, at 268-72.
1 7 The employees bought 8-1/3 percent of the plaintiffs' shares for their personal
portfolios without disclosing that fact to the sellers.




2 1 Mills is open to two possible interpretations: first, the Supreme Court merely
agreed with the decision of the appellate court to shift to the defendant the burden of
proving lack of reliance; or, second, the Supreme Court dispensed with proof of reliance,
allowing the causation element to be established upon proof of materiality. Recent
Case, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 787, 790 & n.11. Affiliated Ute seems to be recognizing
the latter interpretation of Mills as the proper one.
122The Court also recognized that Afflliated Ute involved misrepresentations as
well, 406 U.S. at 152, but it would be dangerous to take this case as authority for the
proposition that reliance is not required in cases of misrepresentations. First, the Court
was able to find a pure omission by the defendants based on a failure to disclose the
fact that they could gain financially from the transactions. The facts did not disclose
any plaintiff to whom this fact was misrepresented. Thus, regardless of how many mis-
representations were made and not relied upon, this failure to disclose a material fact
in light of a duty to do so was a sufficient basis for the Court to impose liability. Sec-
ond, the petitioner's brief stressed that this case involved a nondisclosure and urged that
the reliance requirement should therefore be dispensed with. Brief for Petitioner at 32.
Even Respondent Haslem's brief agreed that if this were a case based on an omission
it might be appropriate to dispense with the reliance requirement. Brief for Respon-
dent at 27, 31. However, the petitioner went further and invited the court to dispense
with the reliance requirement in all cases arising under 10b-5. Brief for Petitioner at
32. Thus, the Court had the option of eliminating the reliance requirement altogether
1973]
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Thus, the Court could have been considering half-truths as well as
pure omissions when it held reliance to be inapplicable to cases
based on nondisclosures. Further, it is logical that the reliance re-
quirement for half-truths be the same as that for pure omissions.
In both situations the plaintiffs are misled by the defendants' failure
to disclose material facts. 18
3. Reliance and Materiality.-The preceding discussion of the
realignment of the relationship between reliance, materiality, and
causation in cases of pure omissions is based on the assumption
that reliance and materiality are distinguishable concepts. To the
extent that actual reliance is required, materiality is easily distin-
guished. 24 Even when subjectively reasonable reliance is required,
materiality can be clearly distinguished in that the test for materiality
is objective. The difficulty arises when the test for reliance is based
on an objective reasonable man standard. Since the test for mate-
riality is always based on an objective reasonable man standard, the
two concepts are easily confused. 28  The distinguishing factor is that
the tests apply to different issues.
In order for reliance to exist, a showing must be made that
the plaintiff believed the defendant's representations to be true and
that he acted because of that belief.' 26  The reasonable man standard
in this first context raises the issue of whether the reasonable man
would have believed the representations. Materiality, on the other
hand, requires a fact to which a reasonable man would attach im-
portance in determining his course of action as to the transaction
in question. 2 7 In this latter context, the reasonable man standard
or dispensing with it only in the context of nondisclosures. By prefacing its holding
on the reliance requirement with the statement that Affiliated Ute involved primarily a
failure to disclose, the Court apparently chose to follow the latter option. But see In re
Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
1-.28 See Brief for Petitioner at 32, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972). Relying heavily on Affiliated Ute, Reube v. Pharmacodynamics, Inc., CCH
FED. SEC L. REP. 5 93,704 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a case involving half-truths, held that causa-
tion-in-fact was established upon proof of an obligation to disclose, the withholding of
material facts, and the active solicitation of purchasers. Id. at 93,092 n.17.
124 Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 n.18 (10th Cir. 1970). It should be noted
that reliance and materiality are treated separately in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§ 538 (materiality), 537 (reliance) (1938).
125 One writer has suggested that "the elements of reliance are subsumed under the
question of ... materiality .. " Reliance Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 3, at 566.
The same writer also made the point that if a fact is material, it is one "upon which a
'reasonable investor' should rely." Id. at 577. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456
F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (2d Cir. 1972); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
54 0, 544 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1967).
126 See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
127 See note 111 supra & accompanying text.
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raises the issue of how much importance the reasonable man would
attach to the information m
Thus, the reasonable man standard in the context of objectively
reasonable reliance is based on the reasonable man's evaluation of
the accuracy of the defendant's representations. This is to be con-
trasted with the reasonable man standard in the context of material-
ity which is based on the reasonable man's evaluation of the im-
portance of the representations in deciding on a course of action.
This suggests that by the very nature of reliance and materiality,
one cannot be used to presume the other: simply because a reason-
able man would believe a representation is not a sufficient basis upon
which to conclude that the reasonable man would also attach im-
portance to it.129  The reverse is also true. This is not to say, how-
ever, that since both reliance and materiality may be used to demon-
strate causation, materiality may not be substituted for reliance in
cases involving pure omissions: what is presumed upon a showing
of materiality is causation, not reliance.
C. Summary
By segregating cases involving pure omissions one can begin to
appreciate the true function of materiality and reliance. Transac-
tion causation, the element which proof of reliance seeks to es-
tablish, can be adequately established in cases of pure omissions by
proof that the fact omitted was material. Proof of materiality thus
serves the same function as proof of reliance, although one is not
subsumed under the other.
By eliminating the necessity of proving reliance in cases of pure
omissions, the courts have removed a barrier to the achievement of
the purposes of l0b-5. Whereas before, the plaintiff had the bur-
den of showing that he relied on the omission, now, under Affiliated
128 The reasonable man would neither believe nor attach importance to a patently
false statement. Nor would he have believed or attached importance to a misrepresen-
tation where the facts in his possession and those which he could reasonably have dis-
covered would have caused him to pause. Insofar as these considerations affect the be-
lievability of the misrepresentation, they are at the core of objectively reasonable re-
liance. Materiality, however, does not take into consideration the believability of the
representation. For purposes of materiality, the fact is assumed to be accurate.
129 However, given the existence of the first element of reliance, that the plaintiff be-
lieve the representations, materiality could be instrumental in supplying the second ele-
ment of reliance, that the plaintiff acted or failed to act because of his belief in the truth
of the representations. Given that the misrepresentation is one which would influence
a reasonable man to act in a certain way, i.e., that it is material, and given that the
plaintiff believed the misrepresentation to be true, the plaintiff would normally be ex-
pected to act because of his belief. This could be rebutted, however, by proof that
the plaintiff did not act as a reasonable man would have in a particular situation.
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Ute Citizens, all the plaintiff need show is that the misrepresenta-
tions were material. The burden is then on the defendant to come
forward with evidence that the plaintiff was not induced to enter
into the transaction because of the omission.
The strength of this presumption of causation and the evidence
necessary to rebut it have not been considered by the courts. 130
But regardless of the strength of the presumption, the important
consideration is that the litigative burden on the defendant has been
enlarged. With this greater burden, the defendant has an added
incentive to fully disclose all material facts.
VI. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Apart from the distinctions discussed above, an action for in-
junctive relief introduces additional factors which have an impact on
the reliance requirement. 1 ' - Since one of the purposes of an action
for damages under lob-5 is to compensate the victim, 32 the courts
are properly concerned that the injury complained of was caused
by the defendant's actions. That is, the defendant must cause the
plaintiff to act in a manner that ultimately results in injury." If
this qualification did not exist, the courts could penalize the defen-
dant even if he were not responsible for the plaintiff's injury.
The purpose of injunctive relief, on the other hand, is not to
compensate the victim of the fraud, but rather to aid in the enforce-
ment of the disclosure standards implicit in lob-5.1$4 To achieve
these policy goals it is not necessary to require reliance. The issue
is not whether anyone was induced by the defendant's conduct to
act in a manner which would ultimately cause injury, but instead,
whether the defendant's conduct conformed to the standards re-
quired by lob-5.
This reasoning was applied in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco135
to sustain an action for an injunction where there were grave doubts
as to whether any causal connection existed at all. The plaintiffs
130 See note 95 supra & accompanying text.
11 The SEC can bring actions to enjoin violations of lob-5 since this is one of the
express remedies provided by the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). In such
actions proof of reliance is not required. E.g., SEC v. North Am. Research and Devel.
Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970). The right of private parties to bring injunc-
tive actions under 10b-5 has also been established. E.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967).
'
3 2See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
133 See text accompanying notes 100-101 supra.
'34 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
135 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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bought a minority interest in S. H. Kress & Co., 94 percent of which
was owned by the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants had managed Kress in such a manner as to adversely af-
fect the position of the minority stockholders. However, the plain-
tiffs neither bought nor sold any Kress stock after they realized the
defendants were not acting in their best interests. Thus, there was
little if any causal connection between the defendants' action and
any purchase or sale of securities by the plaintiffs.
Although this was an insufficient basis on which to state a cause
of action for damages, it was sufficient to state a claim for injunc-
tive relief. The court circumvented the necessity of finding a causal
connection by finding that the plaintiffs in this case were playing an
"important role in the enforcement of the [Exchange) Act."' 1 6 The
court reasoned that since the SEC could maintain an action such as
this without a showing of a causal connection, so could the plain-
tiffs since they were performing the same function as the SEC.
[T]he claim for damages ... founders both on proof of loss and
the casual connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; on the
other hand, the claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these is-
sues, may cure harm suffered by continuing shareholders, and
would afford complete relief against the Rule lob-5 violation in
the future. "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylac-
tic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for mon-
etary damages."'I37
Consistent with Mutual Shares, the Sixth Circuit in Britt v. Cyril
Bath Co.13 8 recognized that a lower reliance standard would be
appropriate in an action for injunctive relief. In Britt the plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief, claiming that the defendant failed to dis-
close a secret agreement between the company and its president
which depressed the price of the stock. The action was dismissed
by the trial court which held that a causal connection between the
alleged fraud and some resultant purchase or sale of a security was
required, and that such connection was not established by an allega-
tion of misconduct coupled with some speculative effect on the mar-
ket. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that in private actions
for injunctive relief the requirements of causation and reliance are
not as strong as in actions seeking damages."3 9
Thus, injunctive relief is allowed with little, if any, showing of
136 Id. at 547.
137Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
138 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969).
189 Id. at 436.
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reliance or causation-in-fact so that it may be included in the arsenal
of legal weapons used to promote full and accurate disclosure in
securities transactions. Such reasoning would not be appropriate in
damage actions where the courts are faced with the additional prob-
lems that attend compensating the victim.
VII. CONCLUSION
The major reasons for allowing private recovery under rule lob-
5 are to compensate victims of fraud and to aid the SEC in the en-
forcement of the full disclosure standards implicit in the rule. As
the elements of the common law action of deceit provide a just sys-
tem of compensation to victims of fraud, it is only natural for the
courts to assimilate them into private actions under lob-5 and mod-
ify them when necessary to achieve the policy goals of the rule. To
become more restrictive than common law - to require the reliance
to be reasonable in situations that require only actual reliance at
common law - would frustrate the basic purposes for allowing
private recovery. The courts have therefore resisted the use of the
reasonable reliance standard in cases other than those based on
negligent misrepresentations.' 40
A plaintiff seeking to enjoin fraudulent practices, on the other
hand, is not asking for compensation and thus the requirements nec-
essary to prevent unjust recovery by the plaintiff are inappropriate.
The major issue is whether the defendant is engaging in a course of
conduct which lob-5 was intended to proscribe. Reliance is, there-
fore, not required in this situation.
The concept of reliance in 10b-5 actions is, as are most develop-
ing concepts, subject to change. Recently, the courts have indi-
cated their desire to deemphasize the concept of reliance so as to
eliminate conflicts with the objectives of lob-5. The realignment
of the relationship between reliance, materiality, and causation, dis-
cussed above in the context of pure omissions, is one indication of
this trend. Further, there appears to be little reason to restrict this
realignment to cases of pure omissions. By deemphasizing reliance,
the defendant is left with fewer excuses for misstating or failing
to disclose material facts. To the extent that this guides potential
defendants, the purposes underlying the creation of the private right
of action under rule 10b-5 will have been satisfied.
TIMOTHY J. KINCAID
140 It is arguable, however, that where rescission is requested, an actual, justifiable re-
liance standard should be adopted regardless of the level of scienter established. See note
58 supra.
